F
or several decades, I have been fascinated by two intellectual challenges that seem, at first, to be poles apart. One is evolutionary biology, especially sociobiology. The other is existentialism. I hope to show here that, although existential philosophy and evolutionary biology may seem to be strange bedfellows, they are, in fact, a remarkably compatible pair. Collectors of oxymorons are probably licking their chops at the prospect of "evolutionary existentialism."
The thrust of this article is that existential philosophy and evolutionary biology enjoy substantial and hitherto unappreciated similarities-in particular an understanding of life's fundamental absurdity, a relentless and productive focus on the individual, and an optimistic presumption of freedom. I turn first, however, to some of the prominent incompatibilities between existentialism and sociobiology, so that the casual reader can understand why evolution and existentialism appear to constitute such an odd couple.
One of the organizing principles of existentialism is the basic notion that human beings have no "essence," as Simone de Beauvoir proclaimed when she wrote that a person is l'être donc l'être est de n'être pas, the being whose essence is having no essence. Or, as Jean-Paul Sartre (1956) famously put it, "existence precedes essence." For the existentialists, human beings define themselves, give themselves meaning, and establish their essence only via their existence: by what we do and how we choose to live our individual lives. This is because people have no essence (no human nature) independent of the specifics of how they choose to live, say the existentialists.
The concept of choice turns out to be especially important because, for the existentialists, human beings are uniquely free. Indeed, in Sartre's paradoxical words, we are "condemned to be free." Lacking any essence other than our own freedom, we are forced to make choices and, in so doing, define ourselves. In a huge universe that is devoid of purpose and uncaring about people, it is the human project to give meaning to our lives by the free, conscious, intentional choices we make.
There is a vast difference between the existentialist conception that there is no human essence and the perspective granted us by evolution, especially via sociobiology. Most biologists would likely shun the question, "What is the essence of human-ness?" If pushed, however, they would probably point to the human genome, the genetic ground substance that establishes the boundary of human potential, and ultimately distinguishes one species from another. Thus, at the heart of a sociobiologic conception of human nature-or hippo, halibut, or hickory tree nature-is the view of living things as a concatenation of genes that joust with other, similar genes (alternative alleles, more precisely) to get ahead. A creature that is merely the physical manifestation of chunks of nucleic acid preprogrammed to succeed has no option for free, conscious, intentional choices, so beloved of the existentialists.
A brief selection from the Letters of John Keats (1952) For evolutionary biologists no less than for Keats, living things have a purpose, one that is shared by stoats, field mice, and human beings. What is that purpose? It is, quite simply, to project their genes into future generations. Thus, the behavior of living things can be seen as resulting from the efforts of their constituent genes to push themselves into the future (Hamilton 1964 , Williams 1966 , Wilson 1975 . As Richard Dawkins (1989) and many others have emphasized, living things are survival vehicles for their potentially immortal genes. Biologically speaking, this is what they are, and it is all that they are. Given their insistence that human beings possess the freedom, ability, and even the obligation to define themselves as they choose, without constraints, most existentialists can be expected to disagree.
Behavior and the individual
For the sociobiologist, behavior is one way genes go about promoting themselves. (Other ways are by producing a body that is durable, adapted to its ecological situation, and capable of various physiological feats such as growth, metabolism, and repair.) Behavior is a means toward an evolutionary end, suggesting a conception of a human essence that is exactly coterminous with human DNA, and altogether contrary to the existentialist position. Moreover, in this formulation our genetic essence precedes our existence, since the anatomical, physiological, and behavioral make-up of each individual follows upon the instructions coded in his or her genotype. This is exactly contrary to how Jean-Paul Sartre and other existentialists view these things. For them, it is anathema to consider that human beings, like other living things, are mere slaves to their genes.
But stoats, field mice, halibuts, and hickory trees likely don't know what they are doing, and almost certainly, they don't understand why. Human beings do. Thanks to recent evolutionary insights, we are beginning to learn what our genes are up to, and how our behavior is likely to tend whenever we let down our guard and allow ourselves to be pushed and pulled by the evolutionary whisperings of our own DNA (Barash, 1979, Barash and Lipton 1997) . Forewarned, we have a knowledge that is uniquely precious.
"Man is a thinking reed, the weakest to be found in nature," wrote the 17th century French mathematical genius, religious mystic and precursor of existentialism, Blaise Pascal (see 1961 translation). People are acquiring a new knowledge, one apparently denied other components of the universe, or at least unknown to other living things on planet Earth: the evolutionary purpose of their genes and thus, of their bodies. (As we shall see, this purpose need not necessarily be the existential purpose of individual human beings. Indeed, I will argue that an important benefit of evolutionary wisdom is that by giving us the kind of self-knowledge that Pascal so admired, sociobiology and its assorted insights leaves us free at last to pursue our own, chosen purposes.)
Pascal prefigured existential thought not only in gesturing toward the crucial role of human knowledge and will, but also in other respects, as when he identified the loneliness and isolation of the sentient human being, writing that "the silence of these infinite spaces frightens me" (Pascal 1961 ). Such fear is understandable because the comfort of human specialness that characterized his pre-Copernican world was being replaced by a vast universe of astronomic distances, and no longer centered on earthly Homo sapiens. Similarly, the great empty spaces of evolutionary time and possibility, and our kinship with lower life-forms that natural selection demands, has frightened and repelled many observers of evolutionary biology. "Descended from monkeys?" the wife of the Bishop of Worcester is famously reputed to have exclaimed. "My gracious, let us hope it isn't true. But if it is true, let us hope it doesn't become widely known!"
As for Pascal and the existentialists following him, the place of Homo sapiens in the biological universe is a chilling reality. "When you look into the void," wrote late nineteenth century existentialist Friedrich Nietzsche, "the void looks into you." Many biologists and lay followers of evolutionary psychology have felt this chill as they looked into the human prospect and saw a comparable void, populated by genes replicating without end.
Also chilling, albeit invigorating, is the focus by both existentialism and modern evolutionary biology on the smallest possible unit of analysis. Thus, Danish philosopher and existential pioneer Soren Kierkegaard asked that his gravestone say only: The Individual. And in his masterful Man in the Modern Age, the existential psychiatrist and philosopher Karl Jaspers (1951) dilated on the struggle of individuals to achieve an authentic life in the face of pressures for mass conformity.
Just as existential thinkers have emphasized the primacy of individuals over groups, much of the intellectual impetus behind sociobiology has come from abandoning comfortable but outmoded group-level and "good of the species" arguments and recognizing that natural selection operates most strongly at the individual level. (Actually, it goes farther yet, focusing when possible on genes instead.) Its individual and gene-centered perspective has given rise to criticism that sociobiology is inherently cynical, and that it promotes a gloomy, egocentric weltensicht. The same, of course, has been said of existentialism, whose stereotypical practitioner is the anguished, angst-ridden loner, wearing a black turtleneck and obsessing, Hamlet-like, about the meaninglessness of life.
Neither existential nor evolutionary ethics
Let us grant (if only for argument) that human beings, like other living things, are merely survival machines for their genes, robots whose biologically mandated purpose is neither more nor less than the promulgation of those genes. If so, then there is no more inherent meaning to life as seen in evolutionary terms than when viewed by the existentialists. For most biologists, the promulgation of genes is neither good nor bad. It just is.
Although scholars (and some depraved political leaders, in Nazi Germany for example) have occasionally attempted to derive ethical guidelines from evolution, so-called "evolutionary ethics" has generally not fared well, because such formulations typically run afoul of what the philosopher G. E. Moore has labeled the "naturalistic fallacy," first elaborated by David Hume: the erroneous expectation that "is implies ought." Although it is tempting to conclude from the universality of natural selection that evolution somehow provides a model of how human beings ought to behave, it does no such thing.
Evolution, by way of sociobiology, can probably tell us much about why human beings confer moral value on certain behavior in preference to others (e.g., Alexander 1987). But it seems unlikely to clarify what is inherently Good or Bad. Most people pursuing evolutionary ethics are in my judgment confusing a bias toward things that are natural and organic (organic foods, natural childbirth) with the sense that anything natural or organic must be inherently desirable. Nature can indeed be beautiful, but also ugly and cruel. What could be more organic than the virus that causes AIDS, made as it is of protein and nucleic acids? Yet, no rational human being would characterize HIV as good. Similarly for typhoid, gangrene, tapeworms, cancer, and so forth. Although some philosophers persevere in exploring evolutionary ethics, even the best such efforts (e.g., Ruse and Maienschein 1999) seem like attempts to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear.
Most evolutionary biologists know that the natural world is neither pleasant nor moral. Once again, it just is. Indeed, some biologists, notably the eminent theoretician George C. Williams (1988) , emphasize that if we must judge evolution in ethical terms then, if anything, it is downright bad (cruel, selfish, short-sighted, indifferent to the suffering of others). The fruits of evolution, just as the process itself, may inspire admiration for its complexity and subtlety, but not for any saintliness or even benevolence. Certainly, evolution is not a role model for human behavior.
Existentialists, too, have an uncertain relationship to morality. Just as biology's freedom from ethical restraints has produced the immense diversity of the natural world (but without imbuing any particular example of that diversity with inherent goodness), the concern of existential philosophers with freedom has identified an immense diversity of possible actions, while also precluding assertions as to what people "ought" to do. After all, it would be hypocritical if not impossible for an existentialist to impinge on another's freedom. When Jean-Paul Sartre was asked by one of his students whether he should join the Resistance or continue caring for his ailing mother, Sartre famously replied, "You are free; choose" (1948).
Although Sartre and many other French existentialists did, in fact, choose resistance, their philosophy, like evolutionary biology, was strong when it came to identifying the horizons of diversity, but much weaker at pointing out which paths, if any, people should follow.
On meaninglessness
It is well known that existentialists are very much occupied with the meaninglessness of life, and with the consequent need for people to assert their own meaning, to define themselves against an absurd universe that dictates that ultimately, everything will come to naught, because they will die. Less well known is the assertion by evolutionary biologists and existentialists alike that life is truly absurd.
Evolutionists might well look at all living things as playing a vast existential roulette game. No one can ever beat the house. There is no option to cash in one's chips and walk away a winner. The only goal is to keep on playing and, indeed, some genes and phyletic lineages manage to stay in the game longer than others. But where is the meaning in a game whose rules no one has written and which, at best, we can only decipher, and which has no goal except to keep on playing? Moreover, it is a game that can never be won and only, eventually, lost.
In short, there is no intrinsic, evolutionary meaning to being alive. We simply are. And so are our genes. Indeed, we are because of our genes, which are for no other reason than that their antecedents have avoided being eliminated. We have simply been, as Heidegger (1962) , a twentieth century existential precursor of Sartre, put it, "thrown into the world." None of us was consulted beforehand. Biologically, our genes did it, or rather, our parents' genes. And their parents' before them. Biologists and existentialists might well join in chorusing, "How absurd! How meaningless to have been produced in this way, and for such an autistic, self-gratifying purpose-the perpetuation of the genes themselves." Indeed, although evolutionary success represents a purpose of sorts, insofar as it has not been consciously chosen, it hardly qualifies as a meaningful life trajectory.
Some might say at this point that if evolutionary biology reveals that life is without intrinsic meaning, then this conclusion simply demonstrates that biology is mistaken. But from the perspective of natural science generally, there is no inherent reason why anything at all is, or should be, meaningful. Certainly, such meaninglessness is what the existentialists have long emphasized, pointing out that the key to life's meaning is not aliveness itself, but what we attach to being alive, what people make of their existence. Kierkegaard, for example, felt passionately about the need for human beings to construct themselves, to make their lives meaningful. Although religious existentialists such as Kierkegaard were especially moved by utter devotion to God as the goal of this construction project, others, following the lead of Nietzsche, have been convinced that such self-definition is mandated by the fact that God is dead. Either way, existential philosophers have taken the lead in pointing to the need for human beings to establish meaning in their personal lives. This perceived necessity for self-construction is fundamental to existential thought, because for existentialists there is no reason to suppose that meaning comes prepackaged along with life itself, even human life. Thus, Kierkegaard once wrote about a man who was so abstract and absent-minded that he didn't even realize he existed...until one day he woke up and found that he was dead! At one point in Douglas Adams's (1980) hilarious Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy, a sperm whale plaintively wonders to itself: "Why am I here. What is my purpose in life?" as it plummets toward the fictional planet Magrathea. This appealing yet doomed creature sought to know its "meaning," but had none. It had just been "called into existence" several miles above the planet's surface, when a nuclear missile, directed at the heroes' space ship, was inexplicably transformed into a sperm whale via an "Infinite Improbability Generator." Evolution, too, is an improbability generator, although its outcomes are considerably more finite. Having been called into existence by that particular improbability generator called natural selection, none of us has any more purpose in life than Adams's naïve and ill-fated whale, whose blubber was soon to bespatter the Magrathean landscape.
For evolutionary biology, as for existentialism (and for the Magrathean whale), life is a condition into which we have been tossed. Its meaning is neither more nor less than what we make of it. Moreover, a sociobiologic world-view denies not only purpose and meaning but even ethical guidelines. Insofar as sociobiology helps identify a kind of goal-directedness (maximization of genetic representation in the future), this is hardly something that most sentient people are likely to accord the status of good. It is even something against which sentient human beings can and, I would argue, should rebel. Indeed, in an already overcrowded planet numbering more than 6 billion people, it seems that such rebellion is called for.
Existential philosophers Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre, and Albert Camus encouraged people to rebel in their personal lives. Similarly, there are many ways human beings can rebel against their evolutionary heritage. They can elect childlessness, saying NO to their genes. I would even go further and suggest that people must do these sorts of things if they want to be fully human. The alternative, to let biology carry us where it will, is to forego the responsibility of being human.
"Going with the flow" of our biologically generated inclinations is very close to what Sartre has called "bad faith" wherein people pretend to themselves and others that they are not free when in fact they are. The opposite of bad faith, what existentialists call "authenticity," is, however, not the same as perfect, absolute freedom. When Ortega y Gasset (1985) observed, for instance, that "man has no nature, only a history," he neglected that this includes an evolutionary history; as such, Homo sapiens are constrained as well as impelled in certain ways and directions. People cannot assume the lifestyle of honeybees, for example, or of Portuguese men-of-war, but such restrictions are trivial and beside the point which is that, within its range, the human evolutionary bequeathal is almost wildly permissive. And the wider the range of potential acts, the greater the freedom, as well as responsibility, even if only to ourselves.
Given the remarkably wide prospect of possible human actions, it makes sense that people try to narrow the range of outcomes, to induce others (especially the young and impressionable) to practice what is widely seen as the cardinal virtue, obedience. Recasting Sigmund Freud's argument about incest restraints: If we were naturally obedient, we probably wouldn't need so much urging, remonstrance, and threats. And yet, on balance, it seems that far more harm has been done throughout human history by obedience than by disobedience. I would like therefore to suggest the heretical and admittedly paradoxical notion-based on "evolutionary existentialism"-that we need to teach more disobedience. Not only disobedience to political and social authority, but especially disobedience to some of our troublesome genetic inclinations.
Genetic influence versus determinism
The fact that human beings are influenced in various ways by their genes is, I believe, terribly important and worthy of study. As I have already suggested, such understanding may even be necessary for exploring the potentials of our own freedom. If freedom-within-constraints seems incongruous, bear in mind that genetic influence is a far cry from genetic determinism or control. There is very little in the human behavioral repertoire that is under genetic control, and very little that is not under genetic influence. At the same time, human beings are remarkably adroit at overcoming such influences. Despite a strong human tendency to see things in black/white, either/or dichotomies, the reality is that human behavior is composed of both genetic components and a hefty dose of free will. Thus, although people are influenced by their genetic predispositions, most of their actions are still largely under their own control, and it is not inconsistent to argue that human beings are evolved to maximize their genetic representation in the future, and at the same time, to celebrate their capacity for rebelling against this heritage.
Consider the game of volleyball. Talented volleyball players do extraordinary things, making amazing leaps and spectacular saves to keep the ball from touching the ground. The game is a metaphor for much of human life. The evolutionary imperative of projecting our genes into the future is like the action of gravity on a volleyball. Gravity works, persistently and even remorselessly, in a certain direction. Without substantial efforts, if players stop diving and leaping and batting the ball into the air, gravity wins. But people are incredibly adroit at keeping that ball airborne. Homo sapiens have invented all sorts of cultural rules, social mores, and systems of learning and tradition, some of which support biology and many of which contravene it, to keep their genes in play. Each successful whack, each contravention of gravity, is an existential triumph.
Human beings may not literally define their essence by their existence, as the mid-twentieth century existentialists proclaimed, but a deep understanding of sociobiology suggests that the existentialists were absolutely right: Our genes whisper within us, they do not shout. They make suggestions. They do not issue orders. It is our job, our responsibility, to choose whether to obey. We are terrifyingly free to make these decisions, to keep the ball in the air, so long as our strength and determination last.
Volleyball is a particularly useful metaphor since it also implies a team effort, and human beings are notably social creatures. In his play No Exit, Sartre observed that "hell is other people," since they interfere with one's freedom. Whether dilemma or delight, our social relationships are very much the stuff of exciting and important evolutionary insights, illuminating our cooperation with kin and reciprocators. At the same time, the volleyball image may be troublesome, insofar as it also implies competition: After all, the reason the ball is kept off the ground is so that it can be smashed onto the opponent's court! A more congenial image might be that of a juggler working in solitary splendor to keep many different balls in the air.
The rope of reason and the grandeur of Sisyphus
It is interesting that the metaphor of a ball was transformed in a now famous essay by Camus, who developed a distinctive take on "The Myth of Sisyphus."You may recall that Sisyphus, a figure from Greek mythology, had irritated the gods and was punished by having to spend eternity pushing a heavy rock up a steep hill, only to have it roll back down again. Sisyphus's torment lasts forever because his task can never be completed. In retelling this story, Camus (1955) emphasized that Sisyphus possesses a kind of nobility, precisely because he knows that his efforts are in vain. Sisyphus will never succeed, just as we will never succeed in winning the roulette game, in contravening our biology, at least when it comes to defying death. And yet, Sisyphus perseveres. Sisyphus has identified his task, his job in life, knowing its hopelessness and its absurdity. He struggles on anyhow, because such struggle is what it means to be a fulfilled human being. Camus ended his essay by going even further, with the stunning announcement that Sisyphus is happy.
There are important similarities between the volleyball of human biology, desperately kept above the ground by various human cultural stratagems, and the rock of Sisyphus. In the end, the game is hopeless. Biology wins because everyone eventually dies, and the volleyball bounces, just as the rock rolls eternally downhill. Moreover, as we have seen, the game itself, like the task of Sisyphus, is absurd.
Under the circumstances, perhaps our purpose, our human responsibility, is to make our lives meaningful by emulating Sisyphus. And perhaps here is yet another way that evolution comes in: For the existentialist Camus, Sisyphus achieves a kind of grandeur because he struggles on, fully aware that success is literally impossible. That is, he knows with certainty that the world is stacked against him. Evolution similarly offers a kind of grandeur, as evidenced in the final paragraph of On the Origin of Species (Darwin 1859 Evolutionary insight, especially with its sociobiologic updating, offers a terrifying degree of self-knowledge-the understanding that our genes are merely concerned with their own replication. Then we are left alone, free to decide whether to sit back passively, or to struggle against this attempted tyranny, like Sisyphus, with all our strength.
Where does this strength come from, and of what does it consist? In one of Plato's dialogues Socrates comments that people are like marionettes, with the gods pulling our strings at their whim. At the same time, Socrates points out that we have one golden string available by which to pull back, to assert ourselves in return. He was referring to our use of reason by which, according to Socrates, Plato, and generations of Western thinkers ever since, human beings can reclaim their unique status as autonomous entities.
And yet there is a deep irony embedded here: The use of this special golden string by which human beings are enabled to distinguish themselves has led to a progressive debunking of humanity's sense of its own specialness. Intellectual history has been, in a sense, an ongoing series of earthquakes, which add up to a continuing onslaught on the proposition that human beings are uniquely wonderful. The irony, of course, is that our capacity for complex thought (our ability to pull back against the gods with this golden string) is itself one of our most remarkably special qualities, and yet, at the same time, it is responsible for a diminution of our species-wide claim to unique status on Earth, if not in the cosmos. The more we pull, the more we are undone.
Thus, with the demolition of the Ptolemaic, earth-centered universe, our planetary home was relegated from centrality to periphery, and Homo sapiens, by implication, along with it. But at least we remained, self-designated as the apple of God's eye, made in His image. Such a conceit became difficult to maintain, however, with the identification of evolution itself (followed a century later by sociobiology's ongoing elucidation of the behavioral implications of natural selection). Then came Freud's discovery of the unconscious and the sobering fact that we are not even masters in our own house. Existentialism, too, has been touched by these various intellectual earthquakes, notably Nietzsche's hyper-Darwinian insistence that in a world devoid of God and values, human beings must rise above traditional morality and define themselves as ubermenschen. In both an evolutionary and an existential sense, even as our species becomes less central, each individual becomes more.
So what?
Recall Plato's golden string by which we are granted the strength and opportunity to pull back against the control of the gods. Substitute genes for gods and you get an oversimplified evolutionary perspective. Substitute the constraints of society and the inevitability of death for gods and you get an oversimplified existential perspective. Neither discipline has suggested an alternative to Plato's rational rope, although each is critical of it. Thus, existentialists are especially prone to denigrate the value of dry, abstract reason, and it is no coincidence that one of the best lay person's introductions to the discipline is titled Irrational Man (Barrett 1958). For their part, sociobiologists are quick to point out that reason itself is an adaptation and, as such, situation-specific and often blinkered. The human brain, after all, is a biologically generated organ concerned with maximizing the fitness of its bearer and the genes that created it, not necessarily with conveying an accurate picture of the real world.
The prospect remains, however, that human beings, despite their biological baggage, retain enough freedom to fashion their own lives and their own future. "The greatest mystery," according to André Malraux (1989) , "is not that we have been flung at random among the profusion of the earth and the galaxy of the stars, but that in this prison we can fashion images of ourselves sufficiently powerful to deny our nothingness." Should anyone doubt the capacity of human beings to deny their nothingness and define themselves (if necessary, counter to their evolution-given tendencies), I conclude with a thought experiment that is homey, homely, even scatological, but that should reassure everyone that Homo sapiens possesses abundant room for existential freedom.
Begin with this question: Why are human beings so difficult to toilet train, whereas dogs and cats are housebroken so easily? Take evolution into account, and the answer becomes obvious. Dogs and cats evolved in a world in which it was highly adaptive for them to avoid fouling their dens. Human beings, as primates, evolved in trees such that the outcome of urination and defecation was not their concern but, rather, a potential problem for the creatures down below.
But are people, who-similar to dogs and cats-live on the ground, doomed to wallow in their excreta, hopeless and helpless victims of this particular aspect of their human nature? Not at all. Although it requires going against eons of evolutionary history and a deep-seated primate inclination (or disinclination), human beings are able to act in accord with their enlightened self-interest. For all its mammalian, evolutionary underpinnings, a primate that can be toilet-trained reveals, ironically, a dramatic capacity for freedom, maybe even enough to satisfy the most ardent existentialist.
